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Abstract. Science strives for a detailed understanding of reality even if this 
differentiation threatens individual synthesis, or the wholeness of psyche. Religion 
strives to maintain the wholeness of psyche, even if at the expense of a detailed 
understanding of the world and Self. This paper analyzes the cognitive forces 
driving us to achieve both. This analysis leads to understanding emotions of the 
religiously sublime, which are the foundations of all religions. These seemingly 
mysterious feelings, which everyone feels, even if rarely, even if without noticing 
them consciously, even if without being able to name them properly, today can be 
explained scientifically. And possibly, we may soon be able to measure them in a 
psychological laboratory. The article briefly reviews new developments in brain 
imaging that have made new data available, and reviews development and 
mathematical modeling in cognitive theory explaining these previously mysterious 
feelings. This new scientific analysis has overcome another long-standing 
challenge: reductionism. Although religious feelings can be scientifically 
discussed in terms of concrete neural mechanisms and mathematically modeled, 
but cannot be reduced to “just this or that” mechanical explanation.  
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SCIENTIFIC DIFFERENTIATION AND RELIGIOUS SYNTHESIS 
Hefner (2008) addressed a fundamental difference between science and religion in terms 
of strivings for differentiation and synthesis: “…nonspecialists are generalists in their 
thinking; they work out their own personal, commonsense syntheses that allow for 
wholeness rather than disjunction of meaning. This cultural pressure for consonance 
rather than conflict receives very little attention in most religion-science thinking. What 
are the issues of contrast between this cultural force and the forces for dissonance? Why 
does our culture embrace both trends?” 
Science strives for an increasingly more detailed explanation of the world. Traditional 
physics explains complex phenomena by “taking them apart” and reducing them to 
constituent phenomena. This method of analysis has been so successful that it has become 
identified with the science itself. Complex molecular mechanisms cannot always 
practically be reduced to atomic interactions. But scientists do not doubt that, given 
enough effort and computational power, dynamics of complex molecules can be reduced 
to the interactions among the atoms that make them up. This method of analysis and this 
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way of thinking has been fundamental to scientific and engineering successes from 
theories of elementary particles and quantum superstrings, to making car engines, 
airplanes, nuclear bombs, kitchen appliances, and to developing medical devices and 
pharmaceuticals.  
Although there is nothing new in this paragraph the consequences alluded to by 
Hefner are so deep that I am inclined to repeat it in other words. An engineering design of 
a kitchen appliance in reality is not always based on explicit detailed reduction to 
interactions among molecules and elementary particles, but this reduction is still used 
when needed in, say, engineering some new materials for a frying pan. More importantly, 
what is taken for granted here is that whenever engineering “from experience” fails, the 
analysis can be taken a step deeper, with a complex process taken apart, reduced to a 
more detailed level of reality, and the problem resolved. This is why most large 
engineering corporations have research divisions, where this reduction to deeper levels of 
scientific analysis is performed. 
This process that sometimes is called differentiation has become identified with 
science and with rational thinking. But when applied to religion, differentiation may lead 
to unsettling conclusions. Religious rituals, when taken apart and logically analyzed, may 
seem illogical and useless. When differentiation is applied to higher religious experiences 
and to the highest religious ideas, results of analyses may seem even more bizarre. Some 
scientists are looking for similarities to experiences of epileptics and schizophrenics or to 
experiences produced by narcotics. These methods of analyses might serve as steps 
toward understanding neural substrates involved in religious feelings. But they are also 
taken by some as indications that religion is “nothing but” a cognitive aberration, etc. 
Scientists and commentators looking for arguments that religion is “nothing but” are 
driven by the human tendency for differentiation, for reducing complex phenomena to 
simpler ones. These scientists, and to significant extent the whole of science, have 
ignored the opposite tendency for synthesis, for wholeness. That is why Hefner’s 
comment that human strivings “for consonance rather than conflict receives very little 
attention” is so important. 
Einstein once wrote that he specifically likes thermodynamics, because it was 
developed without reduction to lower mechanical levels. The world can be understood 
from basic principles on multiple levels, not just by reduction to the lowest one. 
Newtonian physics is a classical paradigm of physics, even so it was not built on the 
theory of superstrings. Physics cannot and should not be built from the lowest to the 
highest levels of complexity based on the same first principles.  
Based on novel developments in cognitive science this paper makes a step toward 
analyzing a fundamental mechanism responsible for tendency to synthesis. We identify 
mechanisms for the two fundamental trends, differentiation and synthesis, not only in our 
culture but in our minds and brains. We will also demonstrate that habits and scientific 
intuition toward differentiation based on hundreds of years of scientific successes are not 
applicable to higher levels of the human mind. Differentiation of higher human 
experiences has fundamental limits and might be scientifically fundamentally flawed, 
when these limits are ignored. 
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NEURAL MECHANISMS OF OBJECT PERCEPTION 
To perform an analysis of the highest human abilities we begin with a seemingly simple 
experiment that everyone can perform in three seconds, and which concerns our ability 
for perception of simple objects, an ability in which we are similar to animals. 
Just close your eyes and imagine an object in front of you. Your imagination is vague, 
not as crisp and clear as with your eyes open. Then open your eyes; the object becomes 
crisp and clear. It seems to occur momentarily, but actually it takes 1/5th of a second. 
This is a very long time for neural brain mechanisms – hundreds of thousands of neural 
interactions. Also note: with opened eyes we are not conscious about initially vague 
imaginations, we are not conscious about the entire 1/5th of a second, we are conscious 
only about the end of this process: the crisp, clear object in front of our eyes. Of course, 
our explanation of this experiment has become simple because through many years of 
research we have found what goes on in the brain during this 1/5th of a second. 
Since the 1950s tens of thousands of scientific publications have been devoted to 
understanding cognitive mechanisms of the mind and to modeling them mathematically. 
Not a single one has attempted to explain this simple experiment, and if they would have 
tried, they would have failed. The main mathematical ideas of algorithms suggested since 
the 1950s were analyzed in (Perlovsky 1998, 2006): artificial intelligence relying on 
logical rules; pattern recognition relying on statistical laws; artificial neural networks 
imitating parallel structures of the brain’s neural networks; model systems relying on 
modifiable models; fuzzy logic attempting to model uncertainties in the world. 
After more than fifty years of research and development, computers still cannot do 
what is easy for young kids or even for animals. Perlovsky (2000, 2006) discusses 
difficulties faced by each approach and why they would not be able to explain this simple 
close-open-eyes experiment. These difficulties were manifest as computational 
complexity (Perlovsky 1998): algorithms that upon logical analyses seemed to be able to 
solve problems of perception and cognition, practically, even for relatively simple 
problems, required more computational operations than the number of elementary particle 
interactions in the entire life of the Universe (this practically infinite number we will call 
in this paper simply infinite). This astronomical computational complexity was related to 
logic: all of these algorithms relied on logic at some point in their functioning. Even 
algorithms specifically designed to overcome the limitations of logic, such as neural 
networks and fuzzy logic, used logic at some point. All learning algorithms use logic in 
their learning processes. A learning step requires showing an object or its image to a 
neural network algorithm as follows: “this is a chair”; and this is a logical statement. 
Fuzzy logic use logic in selecting the degree of fuzziness. 
This insurmountable difficulty of logic sits well with the fact that logic is not a 
fundamental mechanism of cognition. In our close-open-eyes experiment we literally 
“saw” that crisp (logic-like) perception of an object appears only at the end of the 
perception process. 
In the 1930s mathematical logician Kurt Gödel (1931) proved logically that logic 
contains irresolvable internal contradictions. The mind resolves its contradictions one 
way or another; therefore logic could not have been the foundation of cognition. In 2000, 
New York Times named the five most influential scientists of the past century; along with 
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Einstein, they named Gödel. Gödel’s results were recognized as fundamental almost 
immediately in the 1930s. So, why have generations of mathematicians, cognitive 
scientists, and philosophers tried to understand cognition as logical operations? The 
answer is contained in our simple experiment: the mind is not conscious about vague 
dynamic processes. Consciousness is only aware of logic-like crisp states of mind. 
Consciousness perceives cognition as a smoothly flowing succession of conscious states, 
which are separated by hundreds of thousands of neuronal operations. These intertwined 
dynamics of vague states comprising more than 99% of the mind’s operations is almost 
never accessible to consciousness. This is why even after Gödel’s theory received 
worldwide acclaim as one of the most important results in mathematics, mathematicians, 
cognitive scientists, and philosophers continued thinking about the mind as a logical 
system. Our intuitive thinking is built around subjective consciousness. 
We have seen that with closed eyes vague states reach consciousness, and although 
they are not as clear-conscious as with opened eyes, we are still conscious about these 
imagined objects. In our experiment it was about a simple everyday object at a “low” 
level of cognition-perception, where a real object was moments away. Sometimes high 
level cognitive vague states about abstract, life-important ideas reach consciousness, and 
these experiences might be perceived as miraculous. We discuss these mechanisms later, 
but let us now return to “simple” perception. 
Recently M. Bar, K.S. Kassam, A.S. Ghuman, J. Boshyan, A.M. Schmid, A.M. Dale, 
M.S. Hamalainen, K. Marinkovic, D.L. Schacter, B.R. Rosen, and E. Halgren (2006) 
conducted experiments similar to the close-open eyes experiment, but with much more 
details. It was a culmination of several years of preliminary research. They used 
functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) to obtain 3-dimensional images of 
processes in the brain with mm-size resolution. But fMRI is a “slow” technique; it cannot 
resolve processes in time with the required time resolution (ms). Therefore, fMRI was 
combined with magneto-encephalography (MEG), measurements of the magnetic field 
around the head, which cannot produce high-resolution imagery, but provides necessary 
high temporal resolution of brain activity. Combining these two techniques the 
experimenters were able to receive high resolution of cognitive processes in space and 
time. 
To explain the novel findings by Bar et al, let me first give a simplified description of 
the visual perception established through a long line of research. An object image is first 
projected as in a photo-camera onto the eye retina; from there, through visual nerves the 
object image is projected onto the visual cortex (in the back of the brain). After 
processing in the visual cortex it has been thought that an object is recognized in the 
recognition area (on the side of the brain); this is followed by storage of object 
information in long-term storage memory (in the front of the brain). In recent decades it 
has become clear that this picture misses a fundamental aspect of perception: processing 
of information in the visual cortex involves neural signals from memories about possible 
objects; signals from memory projected “down” to the cortex are called top-down signals. 
These images have to be matched to bottom-up images projected from the retina. When 
the match occurs the mind recognizes the object. This matching process explains some 
parts of our close-open-eyes experiment: the vague imagination is produced by top-down 
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signals. But details of this process were not known. Bar et al concentrated on three brain 
areas: visual cortex, object recognition area, and long-term object-information storage 
area (memory). They demonstrated that memory is activated 130 ms after the visual 
cortex, but 50 ms before the object recognition area. This confirmed that memory of an 
object is activated before the object is recognized (!) and memory activation produces 
imagined images. All of these are unconscious. In addition they demonstrated that the 
imagined image generated by top-down signals from memory to cortex is vague, similar 
to our close-open-eyes experiment. Conscious perception of an object occurs when vague 
memories become crisp and match a crisp and clear image from the retina, and the object 
recognition area is activated. 
These complex experiment results have a simple interpretation: perception-
recognition occurs when the memory of an object matches a concrete object in front of 
the eyes. But a remembered object, even if similar, is never exactly the same as the one 
immediately observed: angles, distance, lighting, surrounding objects are always 
different. Therefore memories have to be vague to have a chance to match anything. 
Perception requires “improving” knowledge stored in memories, memories have to be fit 
to concrete conditions in the dynamic process of perception. 
Conscious logic-like perceptions occur at the end of a dynamic process “from vague 
to crisp,” from illogical to logical. As discussed, all algorithms considered for modeling 
of cognition since the 1950s have used logic in one way or another for their operations. 
They cannot explain why initial “imaginations,” top-down signals have to be vague, and 
they did not model mechanisms, which drive vague images to become crisp, as it occurs 
when we open our eyes. As a result, they cannot explain cognition even at its simplest 
“lower” level: perception of everyday objects. One consequence is that computers are not 
capable of cognition, and another is that cognitive science and philosophy of mind cannot 
explain cognition. Existing explanations based on logic have faced multiple impasses, as 
previously mentioned. 
The first algorithmic description of perception capable of describing the close-open-
eyes experiment as well as the Bar et al experiment was published in (Perlovsky 1987; 
Perlovsky and McManus 1991), its more contemporary descriptions can be found in 
(Perlovsky 2000, 2006a). This algorithm is based on a new type of logic, dynamic logic 
(Perlovsky 2006b, 2007c; Kovalerchuk & Perlovsky 2008, 2009). Whereas usual classical 
logic describes states (e.g. “this is a chair”), dynamic logic describes processes “from 
vague to crisp,” from vague images, memories, thoughts, decisions, plans to crisp ones. 
Dynamic logic also overcomes difficulties of artificial intelligence discussed above. 
Let me tell a personal story directly related to this discussion. When 20 years ago I 
came up with the first mathematical algorithms mentioned above, I was afraid to publish 
these algorithms. As discussed, they were much better than anything previously known 
for several classical engineering problems. I was sure that thousands of people would 
immediately pick up the main idea and nobody would remember who the discoverer was. 
The reality was quite the opposite, the idea has not been “stolen”, and it has taken quite a 
while to be accepted. Now I understand why: it is counterintuitive, because it describes 
what is unconscious in our minds. These algorithms were ignored for so long by the 
artificial intelligence and cognitive science communities for the same reason that the 
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Gödelian theory was. Mathematical ideas become quickly popular among mathematicians 
if they correspond to a sequence of logical steps, this reminds scientists of the conscious 
operations of mind, the only operations we subjectively know about. 
 
CONCEPTS, INSTINCTS, EMOTIONS 
Mind mechanisms corresponding to dynamic logic and to the above discussion have been 
described in (Perlovsky 2000, 2002, 2006a). Among the main mechanisms are concepts, 
instincts, and emotions. The mind understands the world in terms of “ideas,” similar to 
the views of Plato and Aristotle. As discussed, these ideas, or concepts, or in 
contemporary scientific terminology, models, are stored in memory. During perception or 
recognition top-down neural signals project images from models-concepts-memories to 
the visual cortex. Perception or recognition entails matching these top-down neural 
signals to bottom-up projections from the eye retina. Since memories never exactly match 
actual objects, models always have to be modified for perception to occur. 
This process of model modification-matching must occur so that we can see the 
surrounding world. This is a condition for survival, a process that is necessary to satisfy 
any other instinctual need. Therefore, we have an inborn instinct to fit our memories-
models to the world. I call this mechanism the instinct for knowledge. Biologists have 
been aware of this mechanism since the 1950s (Harlow 1950; Berlyne 1960; Festinger 
1957; Cacioppo et al 1996), but only with the help of mathematical modeling, has its 
fundamental role became clear (Levine and Perlovsky 2008). Since the world is 
constantly changing, we are constantly refining and revising our models. 
The mechanism of the knowledge instinct is similar to other instincts. According to 
Stephen Grossberg and Daniel Levine (1987), instincts work like internal sensors in the 
body. These are inborn mechanisms that measure vital body parameters, such as blood 
pressure, sugar level in the blood, temperature, and dozens of other measures; instincts 
also indicate to our brain if these parameters are within safe bounds. If they are, we 
usually do not notice them consciously. If sugar level in the blood goes below a certain 
point we feel the emotion of hunger. 
Several different mechanisms are called emotions; here we refer to the mechanism 
identified by Grossberg and Levine (1987). Emotions are neural signals that originate in 
instinctual areas and indicate to cognitive and decision-making areas of the brain 
satisfaction or dissatisfaction of instinctual needs. For example, if sugar level in the blood 
is low, emotional neural signals of hunger drive cognitive and decision-making 
mechanisms to allocate more attention and processing power to finding food, objects that 
can potentially satisfy instinct for food are recognized faster. These instinctual affects on 
cognition occur during the dynamic logic process, before recognition occurs; so we are 
smart not because we understand everything equally well, but because we preferentially 
understand what we need at every moment. 
 
THE KNOWLEDGE INSTINCT AND AESTHETIC EMOTIONS 
The knowledge instinct is similar to other instincts in that our brain has a “sensor” that 
measures a correspondence or a degree of similarity between models in the mind and 
objects or situations in the world, and the knowledge instinct drives the mind to 
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maximize this similarity (knowledge). It is different from other ‘basic’ instincts in that it 
pertains to processes in the brain, not in the ‘lower’ body. This paper maintains the 
scientific point of view that the brain is a part of the body (this is, of course, consistent 
with monotheism). Still, knowledge and cognition are commonly considered ‘higher,’ 
more ‘spiritual’ functions than eating or sex. In this regard we refer to the knowledge 
instinct as a ‘higher’ need than a need for food. Later we argue that it is responsible for all 
our higher mental abilities. 
How do we feel satisfaction or dissatisfaction of the knowledge instinct emotionally? 
Consider a situation when the surrounding world does not correspond to our knowledge, 
and surrounding objects behave unexpectedly: doors do not open, teeth cannot bite, a 
knife spontaneously jumps at you. This is the stuff of thrillers, it is scary, or in a mild 
dose, disharmonious between knowledge-expectations and reality. Conversely, when 
objects behave as expected, it is harmonious. Since Immanuel Kant (1790) emotions 
related to knowledge have been called aesthetic emotions. We would like to emphasize 
that these emotions, which we feel as harmony-disharmony between our knowledge and 
the world, are not specific to perception of art, but are inseparable from every act of 
perception-cognition. Later we demonstrate that aesthetic emotions are related to the 
beautiful and sublime, but here we call them aesthetic or spiritual for the only reason that 
they are related to knowledge. 
This discussion is central to the topic of this paper, therefore I continue the 
argumentation. A view of emotions defined by visceral mechanisms (Damasio 1994), as 
far as discussing higher cognitive functions, seems erroneous in taking secondary effects 
for the primary mechanisms. People often devote their spare time to increasing their 
knowledge, even if it is not related to their job and the possibility of promotion. 
Pragmatic interests could be involved: knowledge makes us more attractive to friends and 
could help us find sexual partners. Still, there remains the pure joy of finding knowledge, 
aesthetic emotions satisfying the knowledge instinct. Levine and Perlovsky (2008) 
discussed brain regions that are likely involved in the knowledge instinct. They also 
discussed that the knowledge instinct is not the only way people make decisions. Whereas 
at lower levels of object perception the knowledge instinct acts automatically (otherwise 
we will not be able to see anything around us), at higher levels of complex and abstract 
thoughts it is not automatic. Often people don’t maximize knowledge; instead they prefer 
to spare mental efforts and to make decisions by relying on ready-made heuristics or 
rules. Later we discuss how these two mechanisms interact. 
 
HIERARCHY OF THE MIND 
The mind is organized into an approximate hierarchy (Grossberg 1972) from sensor 
signals at the bottom, to complex scenes, and abstract ideas higher up. This hierarchy is 
not strict; it is known that interactions across multiple levels routinely occur during 
perception and cognition. The perception experiments discussed earlier have 
demonstrated this. And, although we discussed perception as if concept-models are at the 
next level to the visual cortex, this is a great simplification. The visual cortex itself is 
comprised of multiple layers-levels; multiple levels interact across the hierarchy. 
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Therefore, many neural scientists prefer to call the mind architecture a heterarchy 
(Grossberg 1972). For simplicity we call it the hierarchy. 
It is our hypothesis that understanding of complex abstract concepts involves the 
same mechanism as object perception: a process of dynamic logic, which fits a vague 
complex abstract concept-model to specific situations or experiences corresponding to 
this model. These processes of differentiation (of a vague model suitable for many 
situations into a concrete one for a specific situation) are driven by the knowledge instinct 
at every level (Perlovsky 2006a). For example, when entering a professor’s office, general 
vague models for a book, shelf, desk, computer, chair, etc. are differentiated into models 
of concrete objects observed. But this kind of understanding would not take us very far. 
We strive to understand every situation in its unity, in this case the “professor’s office.” 
For this purpose the mind has a corresponding model at a higher level; this higher-level 
model is remembered from previous encounters with similar situations, and the 
knowledge instinct drives it to match the current office. This is the process of synthesis 
(of many lower-level models into a higher-level model). 
Both differentiation and synthesis occur at every level of the hierarchy. I see dozens 
of different books on my book shelves, and I clearly perceive many of their different 
features: sizes, colors, titles… The knowledge instinct differentiates my vague “book” 
model into dozens of crisp and clear models of concrete books. At the same time my 
knowledge instinct drives me to understand the unity of the “office.” This is the process 
of synthesis: disjointed perceptions of multiple objects are unified in the concept of 
“office.” From the top-down view the mind differentiates vague models into crisp and 
concrete ones. From the bottom-up view the mind unifies (synthesizes) diverse 
perceptions into unified models at a higher-level. Differentiation and synthesis are two 
sides of the knowledge instinct mechanism. Scientific analysis as well as everyday life 
demands both, understanding of experiences in their details, which is differentiation, and 
understanding of experiences in their unity, which is synthesis. This analysis is a step 
toward answering Hefner’s question cited at the beginning of this paper: “Why does our 
culture embrace both trends?” Both trends are most fundamental mind mechanisms, 
however, the gist of the question is only addressed later, when we consider operations of 
these mechanisms at the top of the mind hierarchy. 
Let us return to the simple close-open-eyes experiment. With closed eyes an imagined 
object is vague comparative to the same object perceived with opened eyes. But the 
higher-level abstract concepts cannot be perceived with “opened eyes.” At higher levels 
abstract concept-models cannot be perceived directly by the eyes. This is the reason they 
are called abstract—concepts like “law,” “rationality,” or “state,” cannot be directly 
perceived by any senses. Therefore, the entire higher-level cognition has to proceed “with 
closed eyes,” and has to understand the world with vague models. It follows from the 
previous analysis that higher-level abstract models have to be less conscious than objects 
in front of our eyes. 
This may sound incredible, or at least puzzling: don’t we clearly understand concepts 
like “law” or “state”? To resolve this puzzle we need to understand how cognition 
interacts with language (Perlovsky 2006a, 2006b, 2007, 2009a). Every concept-model has 
two parts, linguistic and cognitive, neurally connected to each other. For example, the 
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word “chair” is neurally connected to a cognitive model-image chair. Linguistic models 
are crisp and conscious in the mind, whereas corresponding cognitive models are vague. 
The higher in the mind hierarchy, the vaguer and less conscious are cognitive models, but 
language models remain crisp and conscious. At higher levels, language models are like 
internal “eyes” of the mind. On one hand they provide the ground for learning and 
understanding cognitive models. On the other hand they hide from the mind vague 
contents of cognitive models. At the level of object perception we can close our eyes and 
directly experience vague perception models. But at the level of high cognition we cannot 
easily close the “eyes” of language. Only in the creative process, when inventing new 
cognitive contents, which have not yet been adequately expressed in language, we may 
experience vague cognitive models at higher hierarchical levels. Most of the time, we 
think and perceive complex cognitive contents through existing linguistic models. 
Thinking creatively is possible due to the knowledge instinct, which modifies existing 
vague cognitive models for cognition of new cognitive contents. But this requires a lot of 
cognitive efforts and the results are vague for a long time until new understanding 
becomes crisp and is adequately expressed in language. Usually we spare the effort and 
think in terms of ready-made crisp and conscious linguistic models. Linguistic models 
may not exactly fit our specific experience, but they are crisp, conscious, and carry the 
“stamp of approval” of century-old cultural wisdom. Using existing heuristics or rules of 
thinking and behavior is safe, but it does not advance cultural knowledge. Using the 
knowledge instinct for creating new cognitive models is risky and uncertain, but this is 
the process of advancing cultural knowledge (Levine and Perlovsky 2008). 
 
BEAUTIFUL AND SUBLIME 
The mechanism of the knowledge instinct, driving conceptual-emotional understanding, 
like most mechanisms in our body and mind, is the result of a long evolution. Every one 
of these mechanisms has evolved for a specific purpose. We are purposeful beings. The 
purpose of ‘basic instincts’ is direct survival; the purpose of the knowledge instinct and 
conceptual understanding of the world is removed a bit from direct survival. At the level 
of object perception our knowledge instinct is not much different from similar 
mechanisms in higher animals. But the higher in the hierarchy, the more different the 
human mind is from the animal mind. Animals do not have language and do not have the 
complex mind hierarchy (likely these abilities evolved jointly along with dual language-
cognitive models; Perlovsky 2006). At higher levels the purpose of the knowledge 
instinct and conceptual-emotional understanding are far removed from the aims of direct 
survival. 
As discussed, at every level a concept unifies some significant part of lower-level 
experiences. This is the purpose of each concept-model: unify a part of lower-level 
knowledge. Higher up in the hierarchy there are more general concepts, which unify a 
larger part of the knowledge and experience. Of course, this synthesis at higher levels is 
only possible due to omitting lower-level details. Vagueness and lesser consciousness of 
higher-level concept-models is the “price” our mind pays for generality and unification. 
This unification or synthesis is an important gain. This synthesis or unity of Self is 
necessary for survival, it is necessary for concentrating the will on the most important 
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goal, alongside the ability for differentiating the surrounding world into manifold detailed 
knowledge. 
Concept-models at the top (or near the top) of the hierarchy are mostly vague and 
unconscious. We cannot consciously perceive their content. Nevertheless we know that 
synthesis, the unity of “the model at the top” is tremendously important, we know this 
from clinical cases, when unity of this model is severely destroyed—as in cases of 
multiple personalities. When psychologists, philosophers, or any one of us discusses Self 
(see McNamara 2009), we talk about some aspects of this concept-model at the top of the 
mind hierarchy. Is it possible to state definitively what it is? How we feel it? No, because 
it is not completely within our consciousness, it is outside of what we mean by the 
conscious “I.” Understanding the content of this concept-model, to significant extent, is a 
cultural construction. One property of this model we know from the above scientific 
analysis is that the top concept-model has a purpose: to unify our entire experience. 
Sometimes, rarely, we feel this concept-model as a meaning and purpose of our existence. 
Is it really possible that our lives have meaning and purpose? I asked this question to 
several of my friends, who are scientists and do not consider themselves religious. Most 
often the answer is something like: “Of course not. How can one scientifically discuss 
such nebulous and vague ideas?” Then I re-phrase my question: “So your life has no more 
meaning than a rock on the side of the road?” This changes the conversation. No one 
would agree with this. Most would agree that there is something like a meaning or 
purpose, but this is so vague, so far away from the possibility of scientific investigation 
that it is not even clear how to discuss it. I would like to emphasize that this corresponds 
to the scientific conclusion reached earlier: the top concept-model is vague and mostly 
unconscious. 
Nothing in the surrounding world could directly convince us that life is meaningful. 
Just the opposite, random deaths and destructions abound, and we know that our material 
existence is finite. Nevertheless, the feeling of the meaning and purpose in life is so 
important, that art and religion since time immemorial have been constructing and 
fortifying this top concept-model in our minds. And sometimes we have a feeling that 
indeed something like this indeed might be there. Those reading religious and certain 
philosophical literature might be able to talk at length about the meaning and purpose of 
life; but as discussed, a language model is only a preparation for a cognitive model, and it 
might hide from our mind the vagueness and uncertainty of cognitive contents. 
Still, sometimes we indeed have an experience that improves our conscious 
understanding of the contents of the top cognitive model. There is much literature about 
ecstatic religious experiences and possible neural mechanisms involved (see McNamara 
2009). These studies address related problems and could be helpful. However, it is a 
somewhat separate topic and I would like to exclude it as much as possible from this 
paper. No one can understand the meaning and purpose of their own life as clearly and 
consciously as they can understand everyday objects. Yet, rarely we can experience that 
these top cognitive contents do become clearer, more convincing. Since it is mostly 
unconscious, conceptual and emotional parts of these contents are not well separated and 
these experiences are more like feelings than conceptual understandings. These feelings 
are related to satisfaction of the knowledge instinct at the highest level. 
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Aesthetic emotions related to satisfaction of the knowledge instinct, as discussed, are 
experienced as a harmony between our knowledge and the world. At low levels of object 
recognition they are usually below the level of conscious registration. We do not get 
elated with harmony because we have correctly perceived, say, a refrigerator, or a cup. 
We notice these emotions at higher levels, such as when we solve a problem that has 
preoccupied our mind for a while. The more important and difficult the problem, the 
more effort it has taken to solve, the stronger the aesthetic emotions related to the 
achieved new understanding. Conscious efforts to understand what is most important in 
life could help achieve this understanding, but it is not a finite effort, it may go on 
indefinitely, and a feeling of some partial understanding from our unconscious may 
surface unexpectedly. It could occur when thinking about a new physical theory, when 
going for a walk, when looking through an art catalog or attending a museum. This 
experience of harmony at the highest level, confirming the meaning and purpose of one’s 
life, we feel emotionally as presence of the beautiful. 
This conclusion is not altogether new. Aristotle (IV BCE/1995) has said that the 
beautiful is unity in manifold, which is an amazingly exact description of the presented 
theory of the nature of the highest model. The most detailed relations between the 
beautiful and knowledge possibly have been given by Kant (1790). He called the 
beautiful “purposiveness without purpose.” He perceived this definition as inadequate 
and tried to improve it in many places in his writings; he explained that purposiveness in 
the beautiful is not related to any finite aim. But without the notion of the knowledge 
instinct, without understanding of the dynamical nature of the highest concept-model, 
which content is culturally constructed and is in the continuous process of refinement and 
improvement, Kant could not give a positive definition of what is the beautiful. 
Understanding of the knowledge instinct and that concept-models, including the highest 
ones, are continuously refined, leads to a conclusion that the beautiful is an aesthetic 
emotion felt when the knowledge instinct is satisfied at the highest level. 
 Kantian “purposiveness without purpose” can be refined today by saying that it is a 
purpose not related to bodily needs, but related to satisfying the instinct for knowledge at 
the top of the mind hierarchy. 
The emotion of sublime, a feeling of spirituality beyond our finite material existence 
is the foundation of all religions. It is similar to and different from the beautiful. The 
emotion of the beautiful is related to an improved understanding of the cognitive part of 
the highest model of life’s meaning and purpose. But this understanding is not sufficient 
for the mind. The mind wants to make this meaning and purpose a part of one’s life. In 
other words, driven by the knowledge instinct, the mind wants to know which behavior 
would realize this meaning in one’s life. Behavior, like understanding, is also governed 
by models (this is a simplification, but at the high levels in the hierarchy, this 
simplification is adequate for our purposes). Similar to cognitive concept-models, 
behavior concept-models are improved and adapted to concrete circumstances of one’s 
life by the knowledge instinct. When one moves closer to understanding what kind of 
behavior would realize this highest purpose in his or her life, the emotion of satisfying the 
knowledge instinct is experienced as spiritually sublime. 
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CONTENTS OF THE HIGHEST MODELS 
Here we have come close to answering Hefner’s question cited at the beginning of the 
paper. Both differentiation and synthesis are fundamental mechanisms of every person’s 
mind. Life demands use of these mechanisms throughout the lower and middle parts of 
the hierarchy everyday on multiple occasions. Near the top of the hierarchy, 
differentiation concerns finding new more detailed and more adequate contents of the 
highest models, and synthesis concerns finding still higher unifying models. To find the 
meaning of life everyone has to develop cognitive models in correspondence with cultural 
models received in language; it is not easy to understand and absorb accumulated cultural 
wisdom and to develop cognitive models unifying millennial wisdom with today’s 
demands. Even more rare are processes developing new models, which did not yet exist 
in language and culture. These processes change directions of cultures and they do not 
occur on a regular basis in the mind of everyone. 
The Bible preserved for us many descriptions of these processes; one of the earliest 
preserved descriptions of a new model of synthesis occurred about 4,000 years ago. At 
that time writing proliferated, languages were evolving, and consciousness was changing 
fast (Jaynes 1976). Differentiation overtook synthesis, and stability of cognition and 
cultures were threatened. Old mechanisms of synthesis did not work, the meaning and 
purpose of life was disappearing, peoples around the Middle East were losing their 
bearings, the number of polytheistic gods proliferated, and the region was enmeshed in 
wars and destruction. God demanded from Abraham that he should leave behind the 
customs of his people and go out of his land in search of Him. In terms of this paper, 
Abraham had to find a new synthesis that would be good enough for the increased 
differentiation of consciousness; he had to find a new model of the highest purpose. 
According to tradition Abraham found this new synthesis. And today most peoples on the 
Earth follow in his tradition of a monotheistic religion. Needless to say, for most people 
feelings of the beautiful and sublime at these highest levels are rare and fleeting, but 
nevertheless so precious that we usually cherish their memories throughout our lives. 
It is worth noting that Jaynes’ (1976) analysis of cultural evolution of consciousness 
and cultures took into account only one of the two fundamental mechanisms of the mind, 
differentiation, but ignored a need for synthesis. Therefore, his fascinating analysis 
explained how differentiation was propelled by languages and writings, how it led to loss 
of assured connection to divinity (ancient synthesis of undifferentiated consciousness), to 
proliferation of polytheism, to loss of the sense of meaning up to the second millennia 
BCE, but came to an impasse incapable of explaining the rise of monotheistic religion. 
A unified structure of the mind is necessary for survival. Higher animals have 
significant power of differentiation and are capable of perceiving many diverse objects. 
Nevertheless they also have a unified executive system in their brains. With evolution of 
language, acceleration of differentiation and complex mind hierarchy our ancestors had to 
evolve an instinctual ability for developing synthesis of differentiated consciousness. 
Otherwise language and concomitant acceleration of differentiation would not be 
advantageous and would not evolve. These arguments refer to our ancestors living 
hundreds of thousands or even millions of year ago (Ruhlen 1994). When contemporary 
language abilities evolved around fifty thousand years ago, instinctual mechanisms for 
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synthesis had certainly been long in place. They continued evolving through genetic and 
cultural selection and this evolutionary process determined mechanisms for synthesis and 
unifying abilities of the highest model. 
We have significant power over conscious linguistic contents of our highest model, 
but most of the cognitive contents are unconscious and determined by evolution. 
Unconscious contents are outside of the conscious “I.” Even as the neural brain substrates 
of this model are within one’s brain, a conscious self does not command it, does not 
“own” it; rather, the opposite relations take place: this model owns and commands one’s 
self at its highest levels. This explains a seeming paradox that a non-religious person, a 
scientist with materialistic views, would not agree to - the suggestion that principally he is 
no different than a rock. The unconscious cognitive model at the top of the hierarchy is 
significantly independent from consciousness and guides consciousness in many ways, in 
particularly toward feeling its highest purposiveness. This model therefore has the 
property of an agent, independent from one’s consciousness, but in control of it. In 
traditional societies as well as among religious peoples everywhere this is called God. 
In our culture, since the ascendance of science, many people consider themselves non-
religious. But it is not in one’s power to change the unconscious structure of the mind. 
The model of our highest purposiveness is outside of our conscious control. The scientific 
analysis in this paper leads to a conclusion that it is not in our power to be “religious” or 
“irreligious.” One could participate in organized religion or refuse to do so. One could 
consider himself or herself a non-religious person. Or one could choose to study what is 
known about the contents of the highest models from accumulated wisdom of theologists 
and philosophers, or by combining this wisdom with scientific methods, as the science-
and-religion community does. One can choose to refer to the agency property of the 
unconscious model at the top of the mind hierarchy, and yet refuse or accept to use the 
word God. 
For a scientist to understand a religious person and vice versa, it is necessary to have 
common language. 
 
NON-REDUCIBILITY OF SCIENCE 
A fundamental difficulty in the past faced by scientists, philosophers, theologists, and 
religious people when discussing possible scientific explanations of religious experiences 
and phenomena of consciousness in general has been “reductionism.” If a religious 
experience could be explained scientifically, it seemed the next step would be to reduce 
this explanation to biology, to chemistry, and to physics. The human being would be no 
different in principle than a rock, and the same fate would be faced by God. Of course, 
most people would not tolerate this conclusion. But from a scientific logical viewpoint 
there was no escape from this conundrum. Some scientists therefore resorted to dualism 
(Chalmers 1996), refusing to acknowledge that spirit and matter are of the same 
substance. Most scientists and theologists could not accept this solution either as it 
contradicts the fundamental premise of monotheism. This conundrum seemed 
irresolvable. 
The reductionism argument was a direct consequence of logic and logic was the 
foundation of science. There was though a huge hole in this line of reasoning: in the 
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1930s Gödel (1931/1986) proved that logic is inconsistent, incomplete, and not as logical 
as expected. But scientists did not know how to use Gödel’s results for resolving the 
problem of reductionism. Roger Penrose (1989, 1994) devoted two books to trying to 
connect the two and to escape reductionism of consciousness based on Gödel’s 
arguments. Penrose has connected the conundrum of reductionism with another long-
standing unresolved problem in basic physics: quantum theory cannot be reconciled with 
the general theory of relativity. His conclusion was that we would only be able to 
understand consciousness after new unknown yet basic physical laws of quantum gravity 
would be discovered. These laws would not be computational (and probably not logical—
LP). Many scientists could not accept this as a solution, because it seemed to entail 
parting with science as we knew it.  
The cognitive-mathematical theory described in this paper resolves this conundrum, 
not by parting with science, but parting with the idea that logic is a fundamental 
mechanism of the mind. Instead of logic, the fundamental mechanism of the mind is 
dynamic logic. Dynamic logic, to reiterate, is the process from vague to crisp-logical. 
Most mind operations are vague, not logical; logical (or almost logical) thoughts, 
decisions, plans appear at the end of dynamic logic processes. This fact is hidden from 
our consciousness. Consciousness operates in such a way that we subjectively perceive 
our mind operations as purely conscious and logical. Our subjective intuition about the 
mind is based therefore on consciousness and logic. Few scientists were able to overcome 
this consciousness-logic bias. Among them are Freud, Jung, Zadeh. Theories of 
unconscious and fuzzy logic that they created are respected, yet too difficult to follow for 
many, as they require a new type of intuition. The same is true about dynamic logic. Yet, 
along with unconscious, the dynamic logic mechanism of the mind is confirmed in neuro-
imaging experiments, and scientists will have to accept it. 
The combination of vague and unconscious mechanisms eliminated the conundrum of 
reductionism. High level concepts involving the meaning of life are vague and 
unconscious. We can analyze them and study involved neural mechanisms scientifically. 
But high level concepts cannot be reduced to finite combinations of constituent simpler 
concepts. This argument is related to dynamic logic, solving the problem of 
computational complexity, which was discussed earlier and which is related to Gödel 
theory, the most fundamental result in mathematics. Computational complexity is due to 
the fact that high-level decisions involve a choice from an infinite number of 
combinations of lower-level concepts. Therefore these decisions involve infinite 
information. 
The seemingly unsolvable conundrum of reductionism, which has led many people to 
doubts about the possibility of combining science and religion, others to dualism, or to 
postulating future non-computable science, is resolved now. It has become clear that 
these doubts were based on wrong intuition, on assuming that the mind’s main 
mechanism is logic, that the mind moves in time smoothly from one conscious logical 
state to another. We know now that conscious logical states of mind are tiny islands 
among non-logical and unconscious operations, processes of dynamic logic. 
 
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
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This paper is one step among many in the science-and-religion effort to mend the schism 
and unify these two most important endeavors of human spirit. While one fundamental 
conceptual foundation for the schism seems to have been eliminated by a combination of 
the new mathematical theory and brain neuro-imaging experimental data, much remains 
to be done. 
A fundamental assumption of this paper is that dynamic logic operates over the entire 
hierarchy of the mind (Perlovsky 2006). There are no competing theories aimed at 
explaining the entire hierarchy. Yet, existing neuro-imaging experiments confirm 
dynamic logic operations only at lower levels of perceptions (Bar et al 2007). 
Experimental confirmation of dynamic logic operations at higher levels is the next 
research direction. 
The hierarchy of the human mind is possible due to interaction between cognition and 
language, the neural mechanism of the dual cognitive-language model (Perlovsky 2007). 
This theory also explains how millennial wisdom accumulated in language is transformed 
into individual cognition, how collective consciousness is transformed into individual 
consciousness. Initial experimental evidence confirms interaction between cognition and 
language (Franklin, Drivonikou, Bevis, Davies, Kay, and Regier 2008). Yet it is but a first 
step in experimental studies of the dual model operating in the hierarchy. 
I referred to the psyche of animals as unified (what I called synthesis of 
undifferentiated psyche). Is it possible to confirm this experimentally? Are there analogs 
of multiple personalities among animals? Answers to these questions are not fundamental 
to the main argument of this paper, but could help to uncover related mechanisms in the 
human mind. 
Neural mechanisms and psychological evidence for spiritually sublime emotions, for 
religious experiences, and for contents of the highest cognitive models are areas of 
extensive experimental research (McNamara 2009, 2006; Newberg 2006). The next 
challenge is connecting this research with the theory in this paper; determine contents of 
unconscious cognitive models near the top of the hierarchy and correlations of these 
contents with collective conscious language parts of the models. In particular (McNamara 
2009) discusses relations between religious experiences and Self; establishing the role of 
Self in the highest cognitive models is a next step. A related research direction is to 
establish the extent to which the top of the hierarchy is governed by the knowledge 
instinct and to which extent by heuristics and rules (Levine & Perlovsky 2008). 
As religion becomes less mystical, science becomes less logical and treads in the 
areas once reserved for theology. 
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